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Summary
The political economy of reform has been an important area of research, ever
since the worldwide recession in the 1980‘s following the second oil price increase.
It became evident in many developing countries that the former policies were not
conducive to continued economic growth. The detrimental effects of their former
policies had been masked by a buoyant world economy, and in the aftermath of
the crisis it became clear structural reforms were necessary to repair the economy.
Yet, the reformers of the 80‘s had highly divirgent experiences from their efforts
to reform, even though they faced similar economic circumstances and had a re-
markably similar set of policies at the outset. It became evident that the same
economic policies in face of the same economic circumstances can have very dif-
ferent results in different countries. The efforts to reform many of the Southern
European economies make the understanding of the political economy of reform
perhaps more relevant than ever.
In this thesis I characterize the levels of reform that will be implemented in
response to different political conditions, highlighting the connection between the
domestic politics and the economic responses to a reform program. In particular, I
argue that when a reformist government faces opposition to a reform, the economic
responses generated by the reform is crucial in building a constituency for its
survival. This makes the sustainability of a reform susceptible to both virtuous
and vicious circles. Where much of the existing literature is concerned with the
timing and sequencing of the reform, my emphasis lies on the depth, or size, of the
reform program. Based on my model I find that the probability that the reform
will survive will determine the depth of the reforms being implemented by the
reformist government. In this way, we can characterize the political scenarios in
which a government will be able to implement a reform, and identify different
”types” of reformers according to which level of reform they will implement and
the probability that the reform will be sustained.
In the second part of this paper I will extend the model to include the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF), in the role of a structural adjustment lender using
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conditionality to mitigate the problems of moral hazard in lending. By adding
IMF conditionality to the model it will be possible to compare the outcomes of
the reform efforts with and without an international ally, and draw some conclu-
sions regarding the impact of conditionality on the reform process. Specifically,
the model implies that conditionality can be conducive to deeper reforms in some
circumstances, while being detrimental in other. Furthermore, in yet other cases
it does not seem to matter much at all. Thus, the results from this model implies
that any judgement about the soundness or justification of conditionality should be
made with regard to the political conditions in the country on which it is imposed.
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1 Introduction
Ever since the worldwide recession in the 1980’s, the political economy of economic
reform has been an important area of research. Now, with many of the Southern
European countries implementing substantial reforms in response to the debt crisis,
understanding the mechanisms of reform is perhaps more relevant than ever.
The divirgent experiences of the developing countries’ efforts to reform their
economies in response to the worldwide recession inspired the emergence of a
large economic literature on the topic of economic reform. Although many of the
developing countries had a remarkably similar set of policies at the outset, the
results of their reform efforts varied greatly. Some countries were able to sustain a
program of reforms quite successfully for many years while in other countries, the
authorities made repeated efforts to reform the economy with little results.
This thesis is an attempt to analyse some of the issues related to the political
economy of economic reform, by focusing on the link between the domestic politics
and the economic responses generated by the reform. The model I present shows
that the sustainability of a reform can be susceptible to both vicious and virtu-
ous circles, and that some governments will be able to overcome these problems
while others will not. The focus of the discussion will be on how the domestic
political scene and the behaviour of investors can determine which level of reform
that will be implemented. A key element is that the same policies can have very
different outcomes under different political circumstances, in regard to the ability
of the reform to generate investment and the probability that the reform will be
sustained. In the decision on which level of reform to implement, the government
takes account of the political feasibility of the reform and its ability to generate
economic responses that will build a constituency in favour of the continuation of
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the reform.
Large parts of the existing economic literature on the political economy of
economic reform is concerned with the appropriate timing and sequencing of the
reform, and the importance of credibility. Notable contributions to the literature
include that of Fernandez and Rodrik (1991), Dewatripont and Roland (1992)
and Krueger (1993). One of the issues at hand is how conducive the political
system is to the implementation of economic reform, and the importance of a
reform program generating sufficient support in order to be sustained. A reform
program with low credibility or political feasibility will not generate the same
economic responses as a reform that is expected to be sustained. In turn, a reform
program that fails to generate investment to alleviate the transitional burdens often
associated with structural reforms may not be able to harness sufficient support for
the continuation of the reform. Rodrik (1991) analyse the behaviour of investors
in the face of a possible policy reversal, and show how policy uncertainty can work
as a tax on investment.
The model I present in this thesis focus on the appropriate depth, or size, of a
reform package rather than the timing of it. It is inspired by Mehlum and Moene
(2010) and Rodrik (1991) and demonstrates how the government copes with the
domestic opposition, and the importance of investors responding to the signals
generated by a reform.
The reckognition that fixing the problems of the developing countries was not
just a matter of short term stabilization, but rather that the fundamental structure
of the economy was at fault, created a new role for international financial institu-
tions such as the World Bank and the IMF. They began to require that countries
recieving funds implement structural reforms, and in the mid 1980’s the IMF intro-
duced a new lending instrument aimed at countries facing longer-term difficulties
and requiring more extensive structural adjustment. The role of the IMF as a
structural adjustment lender and IMF‘s use of condtitionality has recieved much
attention in the economic literature both theoretically and empirically.
Some of the theoretical contributions to the literature on IMF conditionality
and structural adjustment include Drazen (2002), Joyce (2006) and White and
Morrissey (1998). Drazen (2002) attempts to identify the cases where condition-
ality can play a key role. He presents a model of the political environment within
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a borrowing country where there are ”veto players” and special interest groups
that can block reform. Joyce (2006) presents a theoretical model of IMF program
implementation. In his model, nonperfect compliance to IMF conditionality is
attributed to asymmetric evaluations of a programs discounted benefits between
the government and the IMF. In a similar fashion, White and Morrissey (1998)
presents a general framework of conditonality allowing for donor- and recipient
preferences to vary over lending and conditionality. They present several cases dif-
fering in which dimensions the donor and the recipient preferences are in conflict.
Their conclusion is a bit of a downer, as conditionality is shown to be ineffective
in promoting reform and to have undesirable consequences in nearly every case.
With the exception of Drazen (2002), these models do not take much account
of the underlying political scene in the reformist countries. By developing a model
of economic reform and get a proper understanding of the model without the
assistance from the Fund, we obtain a theoretical counterfactual with which to
compare the outcomes when the reform program is tied to an IMF agreement.
I believe that this approach will provide valuable insights into the workings of
conditionality.
The analysis suggests that IMF conditionality will have different impacts on the
reform efforts under different curcumstances, depending on the domestic political
scene. It is shown that conditionality will be conducive to deeper reforms in
some cases, while being detrimental in other. Furthermore, in yet other cases
conditionality will not matter much at all.
1.1 Overview
Chapter 2 presents a model of economic reform in the absence of assistance from a
structural adjustment lender. Using the logic of backward induction in sequential
games, I show how the anticipation of the investors’ and the political oppositions
response to the reform determines the optimal level of reform for the government.
In this way, we can characterize the political scenarios in which a government will
implement a reform, and identify different ”types” of reformers according to the
level of reform they implement.
In chapter 3, the model is extended to include IMF conditionality. The discus-
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sion relies on the taxonomy created in chapter 2, and compares the outcome with
conditionality for the different types of reformers to the counterfactual outcome
in the absence of an IMF agreement. Conditionality will only affect the outcome
if lack of compliance is punished. The discussion is focused around the impact of
conditionality on the incentives for the government regarding which level of reform
to implement. The chapter concludes with a brief treatment of which countries
that are more likely to turn to the IMF in the first place.
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2 A model of economic reform
The general framework of the model is a government or an executive who wishes
to reform the economy. Although an economic reform in most cases consists of
reforms over several dimensions (fiscal, trade liberalization, elimination of distor-
tions etc.), the reform in question is restricted to one variable. I will call this
reform variable τ . We can think of τ as a package of reforms, defined continously
over the interval (0, 1).
Additionally, τ is assumed to have a direct impact on the returns on investment
in a particular sector of the economy. A positive investment response to the reform
is assumed to alleviate the transitional burdens and thereby increase the support
for the survival of the reform.
The opposition do not need to be restricted to be the political opposition in
party politics. Opposition to reform could also come from other parts of the
government or political leadership, where disagreement over the reform program
causes a power struggle within the government.
The timing of events is assumed to be as follows:
1. Government implements τ1
2. Investors invest
3. Opposition decides to accept or reject the reform
4. If the opposition chooses to accept τ1 is sustained
5. If the reform is rejected by the opposition τ1 is sustained with probability λ.
With probability 1−λ the opposition takes power and the reform is reversed
to its previous level of τ0.
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In the next sections I will present the agents of the model, starting with the
investors before I go on to present the political game that is played between the
government and the opposition to reform.
2.1 Investor behaviour
Investors are assumed to be risk-neutral and to have access to two markets in
which to invest. They can invest in a foreign asset, assumed to be risk-free, and
earn a return Rf = r
∗ per unit of capital invested. Domestic investment yields
a return of rτ , and there is an entry cost per unit of capital of . Allowing the
entry cost to vary between investors, we can seperate between different types of
investors. Thus, RDi = rτ − i.
As each unit of capital can be invested either domestically or abroad the invest-
ment deicsion for an individual investor i, can be thought of as a simple portfolio
choice, maximizing expected total return, E(Ri), with respect to the portfolio
weights αi. As τ is the only uncertain element a priori, the expected return is
given by:
E(Ri) = αi(rE(τ)− i) + (1− αi)r∗ (2.1)
From equation (2.1) it is straightforward to see that the optimal portfolio weight
αi is:
α∗i =
{
1, if rE(τ)− i > r∗ (2.2a)
0, otherwise (2.2b)
In the following the distribution of  will be limited to two possible values,
1 < 2. We can think of this as domestic and foreign investors, where the latter
have higher entry costs than the insiders. This is illustrated in figure 2.1.
Now, suppose that there are N investors in total, where a proportion n1 are
domestic investors with i = 1 and a proportion 1 − n1 foreign investors with
i = 2. Furthermore, suppose each have an initial wealth of w, measured in some
amount of dollars. αiw is the amount of capital invested by investor i domestically.
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Figure 2.1: Investors optimal portfolio weight on domestic investment
Then, the total investment response, ∆, is given by:
∆ =
N∑
i=1
αiw (2.3)
As there are two groups of investors according to their entry costs, each having
the same amount of initial wealth w, the aggregate investment response ∆ can
take the following values:
∆ =

∆H = Nw, if rE(τ)− 2 ≥ r∗ (2.4a)
∆L = n1Nw, if rE(τ)− 2 < r∗ ≤ rE(τ)− 1 (2.4b)
0, if rE(τ)− 1 < r∗ (2.4c)
(2.4a)-(2.4c) define the aggregate investment response as a stepwise increasing
function of E(τ), where I have implicitly assumed that equality of the expected
return between the foreign asset and domestic investment is sufficient to attract
investment. This function is illustrated in figure 2.2.
7
∆E(τ)
.............................................................................................................................
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
...........................................................................................
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
..
..........................................................................................................
r∗+1
r
r∗+2
r
Figure 2.2: Aggregate investment response
2.2 The political game
This section presents the political game that is played between the government
and the opposition, and the link between the economic responses to the reform
program and the domestic politics.
2.2.1 Payoff functions
The government is assumed to derive utility from policy closer to its own preferred
level τ ∗. The utility of the government for a given level of reform is given by
piG = µ(1− |τ ∗ − τ |) (2.5)
The executive appreciates the policy gap with a parameter µ > 1, denoting
the marginal utility from a reduction in the gap |τ ∗ − τ | when the executive is
in possession of policymaking powers. We can think about µ as the added sense
of responsibility for policy from being in a position of direct influence. If the
executive loses power, the policy gap is appreciated with unity and the reform is
reversed, yielding a utility of
8
piG = (1− |τ ∗ − τ0|) = 1− τ ∗ (2.6)
As µ is the additional marginal utility of policy when the executive is in power
relative to when he is not, µ− 1 can be interpreted as some kind of power rent.
The opposition has a similar payoff structure to the government. If the oppo-
sition comes to power they will get a utility of
piO = γ(1− |τ0 − τ |) (2.7)
where γ is the opposition equivalent to µ. However, the opposition is assumed
to have an optimal level of reform, τ0, equal to zero and to reverse any reform
efforts should they come to power. Then, their utility will become
piO = γ(1− |0− 0|) = γ (2.8)
The opposition has the choice of accepting or rejecting the reform, τ1, that
is implemented by the government. By accepting the reform, the opposition will
obtain a utility of
piO(A; τ1) = γ(1− |τ0 − τ1|) = γ(1− τ1) (2.9)
Should the reform be rejected by the opposition, a power struggle will follow.
Then, if the opposition come to power the reform is assumed to be reversed to
τ0 = 0. Additionally, should the opposition reject the reform proposal of the
government and lose the power struggle that follows, they are assumed to incur
some political costs cp. Both the government and the opposition are assumed to
be risk-neutral. Then, the expected utility for the opposition from rejecting the
reform is
E(piO(R; τ1);λ) = λ(1− |τ0 − τ1| − cp) + (1− λ)γ
= λ(1− τ − cp) + (1− λ)γ
(2.10)
where λ is the probability that the government will win the power struggle,
a political cost of cp will be incurred by the opposition and the reform will be
sustained.
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The expected utility for the government of implementing a reform τ1 when it
is rejected by the opposition becomes
E(piG(τ1);λ) = λµ(1− |τ ∗ − τ1|) + (1− λ)(1− τ ∗) (2.11)
2.2.2 The probability of winning
As mentioned, when the reform is rejected by the opposition, whether or not the
government will remain in office and the reform will be sustained is determined by
a stochastic process. λ represents the probability that the government will win and
the reform will be sustained, and is assumed to depend on the investment response
generated by the reform. If the reform is successful in generating investment,
entrenched interests are created in favour of the continuation of the reform. In
other words, the support for the reform is assumed to be built ex post.
Hence, the probability that the reform will be sustained, λ = λ(∆), is an
increasing function of the investment response. For simplicity I will assume that
the support for continuance of the reform is a linearly increasing function of the
investment response.
λ = λ0 + a∆ , λ ∈ (0, 1) (2.12)
λ0 is exogenously determined and measures the strenght of the government
when the reform fails to generate any investment. a is then a measure of the impact
of the investment response on the probability that the reform will be sustained.
Figure 2.3 illustrates the extensive form of the political game, reflecting the
timing of events. After observing the aggregate investment response, and thus
λ, the opposition decides to accept or reject the reform, obtaining respectively
an expected utility piO(A; τ1) or E(piO(R; τ1);λ). The investors take account of
the optimal response of the opposition when they respond to the reform. The
government is able to anticipate both the optimal response of the opposition and
the investment response when deciding on the level of reform to implement.
As we have just seen, how the investors respond a reform is crucial in deter-
mining the outcome of the political game. Because the game is sequential we can
use the logic of backward induction. Therefore, before we go on to analyze the
10
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Figure 2.3: The political game in extensive form
optimal level of reform we need to establish how the investors will respond to a
given level of reform and the optimal response for the opposition.
2.3 Optimal response for the opposition
Finding the optimal response function for the opposition is straightforward. Ob-
viously, the opposition will accept any reform when the utility from doing so is
higher than the expected utility from rejecting the reform. From the payoff func-
tions of the opposition, we see that the optimal response will be to accept any
reform such that
piO(A; τ1) ≥ E(piO(R; τ1);λ)
1− |τ0 − τ1| ≥ λ(1− |τ0 − τ1| − cp) + (1− λ)γ
(2.13)
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which, after reorganizing the terms and inserting for τ0 = 0, becomes
τ1 ≤ λ
1− λcp − (γ − 1) ≡ τ¯ (2.14)
Equation (2.14) shows the tradeoff for the opposition between challenging the
government in the hopes of obtaining the power rent γ − 1 and a policy gap of
zero, and the expected political costs from challenging the government. A more
power hungry opposition will be more aggressive and it will be more difficult for
the government to reach a compromise. High political costs from challenging the
government and a low probability of coming to power will make the opposition
more lenient and abstain from challenging low levels of reform. The political costs
cp can be thought to vary from a shot to the head in the most extreme cases, and
a mere embarrasment in the more moderate ones.
As λ can take different values depending on the level of investment, the highest
level of reform that will be accepted by the opposition, τ¯ = τ¯(λ), will be a function
of the investment response as well. A positive investment response will increase
the support for continuance of the reform, raising the expected political costs from
rejecting the reform and make the opposition more lenient and willing to accept
higher levels of reform.
2.4 Optimal investment response
In section 2.1 we saw that the investors will choose their portfolio weights according
to how the expected value of τ compare to the relative rate of return of the foreign
and the doemstic asset. The higher the expected level of reform, the better the
investment response. The optimal portfolio weights for the investors depend on
the probability that the reform will be sustained. This probability is in turn
determined by the investment response. Hence, there are positive externalities
from the investment response on the political game. Assuming that there are
many relatively small investors, each one will not internalize the marginal effect
of his investment on the outcome of the political game. The main focus now is
to show how the anticipation of the aggregate investment response will affect the
investment of an individual investor and in turn the probability that a reform will
12
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Figure 2.4: Possible equilibria for a given τ1
As the probability that a given reform will be sustained is increasing in the
aggregate investment response, and the optimal portfolio choice of an individual
investor is a function of this probability we may get a case of multiple locally
stable Nash equilibria. The line denoted λ(∆) shows how the probability that
the reform will be sustained vary with the investment response, and has a slope
of 1
a
. The stepwise investment response function we have seen before. As λ is
a function of the aggregate investment response, for a given level of reform each
investor will respond to the reform according to their beliefs about the reaction of
the other investors. Thus, ∆ = ∆(λE; τ1), where λ
E denotes an anticipation about
the probability that the reform will be sustained.
In section 2.1 we learned that in order for domestic investment to become
profitable, the expected value of the reform variable τ needs to exceed the relative
rate of return between the risk-free foreign asset and the domestic asset, adjusted
for the entry costs. i.e.
E(τ) ≥ r
∗ − i
r
(2.15)
If the reform is expected to be rejected by the opposition, the expected value
of τ will be equal to λτ . Hence, for a given level of reform, the probability that
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it will be sustained needs to be at least λL =
r∗+1
rτ1
in order to make the domestic
investors consider investing domestically. Similarily, for the reform to generate
investment from the foreign investors as well, the probability that the reform will
survive must be at least λH =
r∗+2
rτ1
.
If the exogenously determined strenght of the government λ0 is below λL, there
can be three locally stable equilibria. In this case, the beliefs of each individual
investor about the investment decision of the other investors will determine the
outcome.
The first equilibrium is point λ0 where the fear of reform reversal deters both
types of investors from investing in the reform sensitive project. The low confidence
in the survival of the reform and the low probability that it will stand is the result
of a self-fulfilling prophecy. Thus, in this equilibrium
• the fear of a rejection by the opposition and low confidence in the aggregate
investment response makes the investors sceptical about the survival of the
reform.
• rejection of the reform becomes less costly for the opposition as the expected
political cost of doing so is lowered.
• the reform will be sustained with probability λ0 if it is rejected by the oppo-
sition. With probability 1− λ0 the reform will be reversed.
The second equilibrium is in point L, where higher confidence in the survival
of the reform attracts investment from the domestic investors but not from the
foreign investors. This is a locally stable equilibrium as the probability that the
reform will stand λ = λ0 + a∆L ∈ (λL, λH). Therefore, both the domestic and the
foreign investors have made the optimal investment decision given the actions of
the other investors. In L:
• the domestic investors‘ confidence in the credibility of the reform is sufficient
to generate a moderate investment response. The investors with higher entry
costs remain sceptical.
• relative to equilibrium λ0, the positive investment response makes it more
costly for the opposition to reject the government and higher levels of reform
will be accepted.
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• the reform will be sustained with probability λ0 +a∆L if it is rejected by the
opposition.
In the third equilibrium, in point H, the high confidence in the credibility of
the reform and the high probability that it will be sustained is the result of a self-
fulfilling prophecy. Here, also the investors with high entry costs are convinced
that the reform will generate high aggregate investment. Thus, in H:
• the high confidence in the survival of the reform generates a high investment
response.
• increasing the support for continuance of the reform, the high investment
response makes the opposition more lenient.
• the reform has a high probability λ = λ0 + a∆H of being sustained.
As mentioned, the investment response is drawn for a given value τ . If a lower
level of reform is implemented, the investors require a higher λ in order to invest
in domestically and the investment response function shifts to the right. Thus, for
a too low level of reform, both the H and the L equilibria will disappear.
The dashed line, in combination with the investment response function, shows
that a strong government with a high λ0 may be able to implement a reform where
H ′ is the only equilibrium. In this case, λ′0 is sufficient for an individual domestic
investor to invest independently of the aggregate investment response. With this
level of reform, all domestic investors will find it optimal to invest in the domestic
asset. Hence, an outcome with no investment cannot be an equilibrium when
λ0 > λL.
Furthermore, the investment of the domestic investors will increase the support
for the reform, increasing the probability that it will be sustained to λ′0 + a∆L.
As it is drawn in figure 2.4, λ′0 + a∆L will be greater than λH . Then, with the
knowledge of the investment response from the domestic investors each foreign
investor will find it optimal to shift their portfolio as well, independently of the
decision of the other foreign investors. Thus, H ′ is the only remaining equilibrium.
I will return to this ”dashed-line scenario” several times in this thesis, and the
mechanisms will become more clear in the next section when we go on to discuss
which equilibrium will be implemented.
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2.5 Which equilibrium?
The expectations of the investors depend on the optimal strategy of the opposition
as well as the anticipation about how the other investors will respond to the reform.
If the reform is rejected, it will be implemented with probability λ. If the reform
proposal is such that the optimal response for the opposition is to accept, the
investors do not need to worry about the sustainability of the reform.
E(τ) =
{
τ1, if τ1 ≤ τ¯(λ) (2.16a)
λτ1, if τ1 > τ¯(λ) (2.16b)
E(τ)
τ1
τ1
r∗+1
r
r∗+2
r
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Figure 2.5: Expected value of τ and investment response without IMF
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Figure 2.5 shows how the investment response affects the expected level of
reform. The three kinked lines represent E(τ) for different outcomes of the in-
vestment decision. As we saw earlier, a positive investment response will increase
the probability that the reform will be sustained in the event that the reform is
rejected by the opposition. In addition, the increased support for the reform will
make the opposition accept higher levels of reform. Thus, a higher λ will shift the
highest point of compromise to the right and increase the slope of E(τ) in the area
where of rejection.
A τ1 ≥ τb will create the three locally stable equilibria we analyzed in section
2.4. The domestic investors find it optimal to invest only if they believe that the
other domestic investors will. Likewise, the foreign investors will invest only if
they believe that both the domestic investors and the other foreign investors will
do so.
With a τa ≤ τ1 < τb the reform will not be sufficient to attract foreign invest-
ment. This corresponds to a rightward shift in the investment response function
in figure 2.4 and there will be only two locally stable equilibria left; λ0 and L.
Setting the level of reform lower than τa there will be only one equilibrium
and it will be characterized by no investment. Looking at the figure it might be
tempting to say that there could exist a τ1 = τ¯(λH) that would generate a high
investment response. Here, the small size of the reform could be compensated
by being implemented with certainty if the investment response is high as it will
be accepted by the opposition. However, as we are dealing with heterogenous
investors, in order to get a high investment response we need both groups of
investors to find it optimal to invest if they have confidence in the aggregate
investment response. Here, it is clear that the domestic investors would never
contemplate shifting their portfolio towards the domestic project as λLτ¯(λH) <
r∗+1
r
. Thus, (τ¯(λH),∆H) cannot be an equilibrium.
2.5.1 Game between the investors
When there are multiple equilibria, the equilibrium that will be implemented will
be determined by the outcome of a game between the investors. This game is
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similar to the well known ”stag hunt”-game introduced by Rousseau 1. This game
illustrates the coordination problems between hunters who can either hunt rabbit
quite successfully on their own, or they can hunt a much more filling stag together.
However, in hunting the stag it may be individually rational for one hunter to shoot
a rabbit if they should come across one, effectively scaring off any nearby stags.
Then, the other hunter must go home hungry. The lesson from this game is that
it would be better for both hunters to take down a stag collectively than to hunt
rabbits by themselves, but it takes a great deal of trust between them to abstain
from the temptation of dropping out of the cooperation to secure a quick meal.
In much the same way as the ”stag hunt”, the game played between the in-
vestors is an assurance game where the foreign asset is the rabbit and the domestic
investment the stag. Although the assumption of many investors still stand, it can
be illustrated by the following game with two domestic investors.
A
αA = 0 αA = 1
B
αB = 0 r
∗
r∗
rτ1λ0 − 1
r∗
αB = 1 r
∗
rτ1λ0 − 1
rτ1(λ0 + a∆L)− 1
rτ1(λ0 + a∆L)− 1
Table 2.1: Assurance game between domestic investors
In this game the domestic investors choose between having a portfolio weight,
α, on the domestic asset equal to either zero or one. Setting α = 0 means investing
in the risk free foreign asset and will earn a return of r∗. Setting α = 1 means
investing domestically and the payoff will depend on the aggregate investment
response. In this game between only two investors, if only one of them choose
to invest domestically the investment response will not be sufficient to have any
impact on the probability that the reform will be sustained. Thus, the expected
net return will be equal to rτ1λ0 − 1 per unit of wealth. However, when both
investors invest domestically the probability that the reform will survive becomes
1see for instance Skyrms (2003) for a thorough discussion.
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λ0 + a∆L.
With the parameter values used to draw figure 2.5, we see that there exists no
level of reform that will make rτ1λ0 − 1 larger than or equal to r∗. If τ1 ≥ τa in
figure 2.5 the expected payoff from choosing to invest domestically will be greater
than or equal to the payoff from investing in the foreign asset, provided that the
other domestic investors also invests domestically. Thus, there will be two Nash
equilibra along the diagonal: (0, 0) and (1, 1), with (1, 1) as the pareto optimal
Nash equilibrium.
It is not clear a priori which of these Nash equilibria will be the outcome of
the game. Even though the expected payoff in the (1, 1) equilibrium exceeds the
return on the foreign asset, it may not be sufficient to compensate for the risk of
being a lonesome investor. In this case, there would have to be a great amount
of ”trust” between the investors in order to coordinate on the (1, 1) equilibrium.
Thus, assuming that all the investors are not lifelong friends, a level of reform
only slightly above τa would likely be insuffient to reach an equilibrium with a
positive investment response. A higher τ1 will increase the expected payoff in the
cooperative equilibrium (1, 1) and the expected payoff for the lonesome investor.
Thus a sufficiently high τ1 could tempt the investors to reach the cooperative
equilibrium.
Furthermore, if the reader can be bothered to have a second glance at figure 2.4,
it is clear that with the dashed line from λ′0, the equilibrium with no investment
response will disappear because λ′0 is sufficiently high to make (1, 1) the only
Nash equilibrium in table 2.1. This will hold for all λ0 > λL, for a given level of
reform. I did not include the ”dashed-line scenario” in figure 2.5 as it is more than
sufficiently messy as it is. However, this would correspond to shifting all the lines
upward and increase the slope in the rejection area, so that for some value of τ1,
λ0τ1 >
r∗+1
r
.
A similar game is played between the investors with higher entry costs. In this
game, the optimal strategy for the investors depends on the outcome of the game
between the domestic investors. Let‘s call the aggregate investment response from
the domestic investors ∆D. As we know from the game between the domestic
investors, ∆D can be either ∆L or ∆0. In order for a foreign investor to find
it optimal to invest domestically he needs to have a high confidence in both the
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investment response from the domestic investors and the other foreign investors.
Looking at figure 2.5 it is clear that if the foreign investors believe that the
domestic investors will reach the non-cooperative equilibrium (0, 0) in table 2.1,
(0, 0) will be the only Nash equilibrium in this game. Anticipating that the do-
mestic investors will not invest, the percieved sustainability of the reform will be
too low for the foreign investors to consider shifting their portfolio towards the
domestic asset.
A
αA = 0 αA = 1
B
αB = 0 r
∗
r∗
rτ1(λ0 + a∆D)− 2
r∗
αB = 1 r
∗
rτ1(λ0 + a∆D)− 2
rτ1(λ0 + a(∆D + ∆F )− 2
rτ1(λ0 + a(∆D + ∆F )− 2
Table 2.2: Assurance game between foreign investors
A larger τ1 will increase the foreign investors confidence in the investment
response from the domestic investors. Furthermore, by increasing the expected
payoff for a lonesome foreign investor and the expected payoff in the cooperative
equilibrium, a higher level of reform will make it more tempting for the foreign
investors to set α = 1. It is clear that a slight change in τ1 can have major
consequenses for the sustainability of the reform.
Returning to the famous dashed-line scenario for a moment, if we are to take
the graphics in figure 2.4 seriously, λ′0 is constructed so that λ
′
0 + a∆L ≥ λH . This
implies that the λLτ1 line in figure 2.5 shifts upward such that for some values of
τ1, λLτ1 ≥ r∗+2r . Then the expected level of reform is sufficient to make it optimal
for each foreign investors to invest in the domestic project no matter what the
other foreign investors do. Thus, in the dashed-line scenario there will only be one
equilibrium, and this equilibrium is characterized by a high investment response
and a high probability of the reform being sustained.
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2.5.2 Ensuring high investment response
Provided that the government is not too weak, there will be a level of reform that
is able to ensure a high investment response. By implementing a level of reform
such that
rτ1λ0 − 1 ≥ r∗ ⇒ τ1 ≥ r
∗ + 1
rλ0
(2.17)
If (2.17) is satisfied, α = 1 will be the dominant strategy for all domestic
investors. Then, the cooperative equilibrium will be the only Nash equilibrium
in the assurance game between the domestic investors. This level of reform will
be sufficient to ensure an investment response of ∆D = ∆L. In order to ensure a
high investment response, the level of reform must be such that (1, 1) is the only
equilibrium in the game between the foreign investors as well. This requires a τ1
such that ∆D = ∆L and rτ1λL − 2 ≥ r∗. Thus, the level of reform necessary to
ensure a high investment response is
τ1 ≥ max{r
∗ + 1
rλ0
,
r∗ + 2
rλL
} (2.18)
From this we also see that for a government to be able to ensure a positive
investment response with certainty it needs to have sufficient support prior to the
implementation of the reform. With a λ0 < λ
min = r
∗+1
r
, it will not be possible
to generate any investment response with certainty even with τ1 = 1. The case
illustrated in figure 2.5 is an example of this.
To simplify the analysis in the following section I will assume that the investors
are not able to coordinate on the cooperative equilibrium unless domestic invest-
ment is the dominant strategy. That is, any level of reform lower than τL will not
generate investment and will be sustained with probability λ0.
2.6 Optimal level of reform
Now that we have established the optimal response of the opposition and the
investors, we can use the logic of backward induction to find the optimal level of
reform for the government.
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The government will choose the value of τ1 that maximizes the expected payoff
given the optimal strategy of the opposition and the expected investment response.
To find what level of reform the government will implement we can rely on our
economic intuition to rank the different alternatives. As τ is continuously defined
over the interval (0, 1), there is an infite number of alternatives, but luckily very
few of them are relevant. In the following I will identify some candidates for τ1 that
in different circumstances might be the optimal choice, before I go on to discuss
the ranking of these candidates more thoroughly.
The payoff structure for the government will provide a good starting point in
the investigation of the optimal level of reform. To quickly repeat the lessons from
section 2.2.1, by implementing a level of reform τ1 the government will obtain the
utility
piG = µ(1− |τ ∗ − τ1|) (2.19)
if the reform is accepted by the opposition. By implementing a reform that
will be rejected by the opposition the expected utility becomes
E(piG(τ1);λ) = λµ(1− |τ ∗ − τ1|) + (1− λ)(1− |τ ∗ − τ0|) (2.20)
Looking at equations (2.20) and (2.19), we can immediately discard all levels
of reform that have the same probability of being sustained as the unconstrained
optimal level of reform τ ∗. Thus, if τ ∗ can be reached through a compromise
with the opposition, the unconstrained optimum will dominate all other levels of
reform that will be accepted by the opposition. The same logic holds when τ ∗ is
high enough to generate investment. It will dominate all other levels of reform that
will generate the same investment response and thus have the same probability of
being sustained.
Furthermore, if τ ∗ > τ¯0 so that it will be rejected by the opposition and not
able to ensure a high investment response, the probability that a level of reform
equal to τ ∗ may be susceptible to vicious and virtuous circles. However, as we
saw in section 2.5, unless the unconstrained optimal level of reform is quite high
the circles are likely to be of the vicious kind and the reform will be sustained
with probability λ0. Then, it will dominate all other levels of reform that will be
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sustained with probability λ0. From this we can conclude that the unconstrained
optimum is an obvious candidate for the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium level
of reform.
When τ ∗ is unacceptable to the opposition, the government could find it op-
timal to sacrifice parts of the reform in order to have it sustained with certainty.
Then, the highest level of reform that can be reached through a compromise, τ¯0 is
another candidate for the level of reform that solves the game2. In terms of opti-
mal levels of reform, whenever τ ∗ cannot be implemented through a compromise,
τ¯0 will be the corner solution to
max
τ1
µ(1− |τ ∗ − τ1|)
subject to τ ≤ λ0
1− λ0 cp − (γ − 1)
(2.21)
and will of course dominate all other levels of reform that can be reached
through a compromise.
If τ ∗ is too small to generate any investment we also have to consider whether
the government is willing to go beyond its unconstrained optimum in order generate
moderate and high investment responses and thereby increase the sustainability
of the reform. Lets call the lowest level of reform that will generate a moderate
investment response τL. In section 2.5.2 we found this level of reform to be
τL =
r∗ + 1
rλ0
(2.22)
Similarily, we can call the lowest level of reform that is able to generate a high
investment response τH , where
τH = max{r
∗ + 1
rλ0
,
r∗ + 2
rλL
} (2.23)
Whenever τ ∗ is too small to generate a high investment response, τH will be
the corner solution to the following maximization problem:
2A stronger government might be able to get τ¯(λL) >
r∗+1
r , but as the downside risk for
lonely investors is very large compared to the premium, the government would have to be very
strong in order to get the domestic investors to coordinate on the cooperative Nash equilibrium.
So for now, I will stick to the discussion τ¯0 as the highest level of reform that can be reached
through a compromise.
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max
τ1
λHµ(1− |τ ∗ − τ1|) + (1− λH)(1− |τ ∗ − τ0|)
subject to λLτ1 ≥ r
∗ + 2
r
and λ0τ1 ≥ r
∗ + 1
r
(2.24)
τL is similarily defined. When τ ∗ is not sufficient to generate investment, τL will
dominate all other levels of reform generating a moderate investment response and
τH will dominate all other levels of reform that is able to generate high investment.
So that we won‘t have to worry about so many candidates, I will assume that
the lowest level of reform necessary to generate a high investment response will
always dominate the lowest level necessary to generate a moderate investment
response. Formally, this requires that
E(piG(τ
H);λH) > E(piG(τ
L);λL) (2.25)
which by some simple manipulation of the expressions and inserting the ex-
pressions for λH and λL from (2.12), can be written
(µ− 1 + τ ∗)a(∆H −∆L) > µ(λH |τ ∗ − τH | − λL|τ ∗ − τL|) (2.26)
The left hand side of (2.26) shows the benefit from a higher investment response
on the probability of a reform reversal and the government keeping its power rent
µ− 1. The right hand side represents the disutility from having a level of reform
further away from the unconstrained optimum τ ∗. We see that this inequality
is more likely to hold when the investment response is successful in building a
constituency for the continuance of the reform (high a). Of course, it may be the
case that the government is only able to generate a moderate investment response.
Then, we would have to consider τL rather than τH .
Now that we have narrowed our scope from an infinite number of alternatives to
only three, we can move on to discuss the ranking between these three candidates
more closely.
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2.6.1 Ideologies and practicalities
We already know that the unconstrained optimal level of reform will dominate all
other levels of reform that have the same probability of being sustained. Now we
need to check the willingness of the government to sacrifice some of the reform in
order to have it sustained with certainty, and the willingness to go beyond the τ ∗
in order to generate investment. In the following analysis I will assume that the
government is biased towards its unconstrained optimum, so that in the case of
indifference, τ ∗ will be chosen. If we allow ourselves to be a bit crude, we might
say that the decision on which level of reform to implement represents a tradeoff
between practicalities and ideologies. The risk of losing power is surely a rather
impractical aspect of attempting to reform. This risk can be reduced, and even
removed completely, by sacrificing on the content of the reform.
First, suppose τ¯0 < τ
∗ < τH . Then, the unconstrained optimum will not be
sufficient to overcome the possibility of vicious circles. When the government an-
ticipates that the investors will not be able to coordinate in the (1, 1) equilibrium,
the unconstrained optimum will be preferred to the compromising level of reform
if
E(piG(τ
∗);λ0) ≥ piG(τ¯0) (2.27)
The expression in (2.27) does not provide us with much insight, so we should
insert for the payoff functions and rearrange the terms in order to get
µ|τ ∗ − τ¯0| ≥ (1−λ0)(µ− 1 + τ ∗) (2.28)
Here, in keeping with the crudeness of our interpretations, the right hand side
can be regarded as the ”practical” aspect of choosing τ¯0. By reducing the risk
of losing the power rent and ending up with reform reversal from 1 − λ0 to zero,
reaching a compromise become a more desirable alternative. The left hand side
shows the perhaps more ”ideological” disutility from diluting the reform program in
order to reach a compromise with the opposition. If the reduced utility from having
a too low level of reform is greater than or equal to the benefits of reduced risk by
implementing τ¯0, the unconstrained optimum will be preferable to compromise.
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To see the how the strenght of the government affects this tradeoff we can take
the derivative with respect to λ0 on both sides, yielding:
−µ(τ
∗ − τ¯0)
|τ ∗ − τ¯0|
∂τ¯0
∂λ0
≥ −(µ− 1 + τ ∗)
µ− 1 + τ ∗ ≥ µ cp
(1− λ0)2
(2.29)
(2.29) shows that λ0 will have two effects. First, by reducing the risk of a policy
reversal and loss of power rent associated with implementation of τ ∗, a higher λ0
will make τ ∗ a more desirable alternative. Second, a stronger government will
be able to reach a compromise with a more substantial reform, and thus have
to sacrifice less of the reform in order to reach a compromise with the opposition.
The net effect depends on the size of the potential political costs for the opposition
from rejecting a reform proposal. Unless these costs are quite low the latter effect
will dominate the former.
The above analysis suggests that a strong government is more likely to reach
a compromise with the opposition than a weak one. However, it could also be the
case that a government is so weak that the chances of τ ∗ being sustained becomes
sufficiently small, so that the government would rather dilute the reform or even
to abandon it altogether in order to stay in power.
Furthermore, the unconstrained optimum will be preferred to any level of re-
form capable of generating a high investment response if
E(piG(τ
∗);λ0) ≥ E(piG(τH);λH)
λHµ|τ ∗ − τH | ≥ a∆H(µ− 1 + τ ∗)
(2.30)
which, by inserting for λH = λ0 + a∆H and rearranging the terms become
λHµ|τ ∗ − τH | ≥ a∆H(µ− 1 + τ ∗) (2.31)
The inequality in (2.31) shows the ranking between a level of reform generating
a high investment response and the unconstrained optimum. If this is satisfied, τ ∗
will yield a higher expected utility than τH and thus be the preferable choice. We
can see that the additional support for the continuance of the reform can make
it optimal for the government to go beyond the unconstrained optimum in order
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to reduce the risk of losing the power rent and ending up with a policy reversal.
Also here, the strenght of the government plays an important role. A higher λ0
will only affect the left hand side of this inequality, denoting the reduced utility
from having a level of reform beyond τ ∗.
With a higher λ0, the expected value of the gap between τ
∗ and τH will increase
for a given τH , making a high level of reform less desirable. On the other hand,
a stronger government will be able to generate a high investment response with a
less ambitious reform, reducing this gap. By taking the derivative with respect to
λ0 we can show that the latter effect dominates the former:
∂λHµ|τ ∗ − τH |
∂λ0
= µ|τ ∗ − τH |+ λHµ |τ
∗ − τH |
(τ ∗ − τH)
r(r∗ + 2)
(rλL)2
= µτH
(
1− λH
λL
)
− µτ ∗ < 0
(2.32)
To get to the last expression in (2.32) I have used that τH = r
∗+2
rλL
from
(2.23). Thus, a stronger government is more likely than a government with less
support to go beyond its unconstrained optimal level of reform in order to generate
investment.
Now we have seen how the expected utility from implementing τ ∗ compare to
the expected utility from implementing any other level of reform. However, for
completeness there is one additional scenario we need to consider. Namely when
τ ∗ ≥ τH . It has already been established that τ ∗ will dominate any other level of
reform generating a high investment response. But it could still be the case that
the government would find it optimal to reach a compromise with the opposition
rather than implementing the unconstrained optimum. Thus we need to check
whether
E(piG(τ
∗);λH) ≥ piG(τ¯0) (2.33)
which can be written as
µ|τ ∗ − τ¯0| ≥ (1−λH)(µ− 1 + τ ∗) (2.34)
This is obviously a looser condition than the one we saw in equation (2.28) and
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is likely to be satisfied. In order for this to be a relevant case, τ ∗ needs to be quite
high, so the policy gap between the unconstrained optimum and the compromising
level of reform is likely to be large. However, a high τ ∗ will also increase the
disutility from a potential policy reversal associated with implementation of a
reform that will be rejected by the opposition. The net effect though, seems to
be in favour of implementing the unconstrained optimum, so that (2.34) is most
likely satisfied.
2.6.2 Playing it safe or going for glory
If neither (2.28) nor (2.31) are satisifed and the unconstrained optimal level of
reform is unable to generate investment, the choice will be between reaching a
compromise with the opposition or implementing a more ambitious reform capable
of generating a high investment response:
piG(τ¯0) ≥ E(piG(τH);λH) (2.35)
Inserting from the payoff functions and rearranging the terms gives us 3
(1− λH)(µ− 1 + τ ∗) ≥ µ(|τ ∗ − τ¯0| − λH |τ ∗ − τH |) (2.36)
If (2.36) is satisfied, a compromise will yield a greater expected utility than τH .
The left hand side, as usual, shows how the risk associated with implementing a
reform that will be rejected by the opposition makes a compromise more desirable.
The right hand side shows basically the same as before. When the constrained
optimum is not the same as the unconstrained optimum, the government will want
to implement a reform with as small an expected policy gap as possible. Thus, the
expected gap between τH and τ ∗ must be smaller than that from implementing
the compromising reform in order to compensate for the expected loss of power
rent.
In this case it is more difficult to see how the strength of the government
will affect the outcome. As we have seen before, a stronger government is able
3In line with the assumtpion of a bias towards the unconstrained optimum, the use of the
greater-than-or-equal-to sign implicitly assumes that τ¯0 is closer to τ
∗ than τH is. However, this
could easily be the other way around and should not be thought of as a general assumption.
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to reach a more desirable compromise with the opposition, but also to convince
the investors with less ambitious levels of reform. Furthermore, a higher λ0 will
reduce the risk of having a policy reversal and lose the power rent associated with
implementing τH . Which of these effects will dominate is unclear and depends on
the relative reductions in the policy gap for τ¯0 and τ
H from having a larger λ0.
A greater impact of the investment response on the probability that the reform
will be sustained, larger a, will have the same effect as a higher λ0 except that
it will not affect the bargaining power of the government vis-a`-vis the opposition.
Thus, when a is large, the executive will be more inclined to implement a more
ambitious reform program.
I mentioned briefly that the government may only be able to generate invest-
ment from the domestic investors. Then, we would have to insert τL for τH and
λL for λH . Obviously, this will make both the compromising level of reform and
the unconstrained optimum more attractive, compared to when it was possible to
reach high investment.
2.7 A taxonomy
Based on the choice of level of reform to implement we can seperate between three
”types” of reformers, creating a simple taxonomy that will be useful when we
explore how the IMF may alter the outcomes in the next chapter.
A τ ∗-country is likely to be characterized by a rather weak government with a
moderate to high unconstrained optimal level of reform. When the government is
too weak to generate any investment response with the reform, it will be a choice
between reaching a compromise with the opposition and attempting to implement
τ ∗ even in the absence of political support. As a compromise would dilute the
reform package to a minimum, the government choose to implement their uncon-
strained optimal level of reform at the risk of losing political power. Consequently,
the reforms implemented by the τ ∗-countries will have a small probability of being
sustained. To make things more exciting, I will refer to the τ ∗-countries as the
”brave idealists” in the next chapter. The case of Brazil can serve as a real-world
example of a τ ∗-country, where the government made several failed attempts at
implementing reforms. Brazil had a weak factional state throughout the 1980‘s
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(Krueger (1993, p. 116)). By the end of 1991, Brazil had had eleven finance min-
isters and six major reform programs announced since the first plan in 1986.
A country where reforms are implemented through reaching a compromise with
the opposition is likely to be characterized by a stronger government. A stronger
government is also more likely to be able to generate investment response as the
sustainability of the reform is more credible when the government is strong. Thus,
the government in a τ¯ -country is likely to have less ambitious reform plans. Al-
though, if the government is sufficiently strong the reforms that can be reached
through a compromise can be quite substantial as well. Indeed, one could argue
that Pinochet‘s Chile is a case of a τ¯ -country and was able to implement mas-
sive reforms, successfully supressing any opposition. The other extreme of the
τ¯ -countries are the ones where the opposition is so strong that the reform pro-
gram is almost abandoned altogether. This might have been the case in Ecuador
for instance, which was a highly divided country and the state had traditionally
been weak. In Bates and Krueger (1993, p. 19), the Ecuadorian reform efforts is
described as ”muddling through”, where successive administrations were able to
undertake some reforms but unable to carry them out without considerable dilu-
tion as opposition to the measures mounted. In the next chapter, the discussion
on the compromisers will be focused on the case where the government choose τ¯0
because it is sufficiently strong to reach a satisfying compromise.
Finally, we have the τH-country. We can call the government of these countries
the ”true reformers”. Likely to share the characteristics of a compromising country
with a strong political leadership, the true reformers will have a more reform-
minded government. In this case, it will not be necessary to go very far beyond
the unconstrained optimum in order to generate high investment, making the
”ideological” costs of doing so are smaller than for the compromising country
with a lower τ ∗. Another way a true reformer can be thought to differ from the
compromisers is that the support for the government will be more dependent on the
outcome of the reform, higher a, so that the increased support from implementing
a reform that generates a high investment response reduces the risk from going
beyond the limits of what the opposition will accept.
Now that we have seen how a reformist government might behave it is time to
see how things might change when we bring in some international financial insti-
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tution to assist the government in its struggle to reform. The analysis that follows
could be applied to any donor or structural adjustment lending institution using
conditionality to mitigate the problem of moral hazard in its lending. However, as
the IMF has been my primary interest I will focus the discussion on the Fund.
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3 Adding the Fun(d) to reform
In chapter 2 we had a lot of fun in trying to characterize the subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium in the absence of an IMF agreement. In this chapter we will see how
the presence of the Fund may change the outcomes. The basic setup is the same
as before, but the setting is now a country having negotiated a deal with the IMF
about the level of reform, τF , and is once again deciding on the level of reform to
implement. However, as I spent so much ink on characterizing the outcome of the
game in the previous chapter, I will now take a more indirect approach. In the
following analysis I will use the results from chapter 2 as a reference, and investigate
the influence of IMF conditionality on the reform decision of the government. I
will also discuss briefly the possible influence of the IMF‘s ”seal of approval” on
the ability of a reform to generate investment. Then, after invstigating how tying
the reform to an IMF agreement can influence the outcomes, we will have a brief
look at which type of countries that are most likely to turn to the Fund in the first
place.
3.1 Conditionality and costs of non-compliance
In this section I will identify and discuss the channels through which the presence
of the Fund can be thought to change the outcomes. As noted in the introduction,
the conditionality in IMF programs has been identified as an important channel
of IMF influence in the literature. See for instance Joyce (2004).
The discussion of IMF conditionality will be linked to figure 3.1 which is the
same as we have seen before, with the inclusion of three vertical dashed lines. As
will become clear in the next section, these lines correspond to the new levels of
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reform that can be reached through a compromise with the opposition when the
Fund is involved.
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Figure 3.1: Expected value of τ and investment response with IMF
In turning to the IMF for assistance a country exposes itself to the conditional-
ity set by the IMF. Failing to meet these conditions is assumed to come at a cost.
These costs could come in many forms, the most immediate one being denied ac-
cess to the remaining credit set aside for the agreement. Vreeland (2003, p. 62)
discuss some other costs that could be caused by noncompliance. In addition to
resitricted access to the IMF loan it could become more difficult to obtain a new
agreement in the future, though empirically this do not seem to be a threat to
be taken seriously as non-implementation is rarely punished effectively (see for
instance Killick (1998)). A more indirect cost of noncompliance, perhaps mostly
relevant for developing countries, is through informal creditor groups such as the
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Paris Club that reschedules country debt and almost always demands that the
country is in good standings with the IMF.
Another sanction for cancelling an IMF agreement may come through foreign
investors. Edwards (2005) finds that ”Suspending an IMF program not only causes
portfolio outflows, but the magnitude of these outflows is greater than the counter-
factual value of the same state not being under the Fund program.” This response
by the investors should however not be confused with the investment response
generated by the reform in this model. The investment response modelled here is
a direct consequence of the change in τ and cannot be negative, while the poten-
tial capital to flight included in the cancellation costs are better to be regarded as
coming from the cancellation of the program rather than τ itself, for instance by
creating uncertainty about other policies as well.
I will assume the costs of noncompliance to be linearily increasing in the gap
between the level of reform set in the loan conditions and the reform being imple-
mented. As long as the conditions set by the IMF are met, there will be no costs
from implementing further reform. Thus,
C = βmax{τF − τ1, 0} (3.1)
where β can be interperated as the unit cost of noncompliance. With the
inclusion of cancellation costs, the expected payoff for the government when im-
plementing a lower level of reform than τF become:
E(pi′G(τ1);λ) =λ(µ(1− |τ ∗ − τ1|)− β(τF − τ1))
+ (1− λ)(1− |τ ∗ − τ0| − β(τF − τ0)
=λµ((1− |τ ∗ − τ1|) + (1− λ)(1− τ ∗)− β(τF − λτ1)
(3.2)
With probability λ the proposed level of reform, τ1 will be sustained and the
costs for noncompliance β(τF − τ1) will be incurred. With probability 1 − λ the
executive will lose power and the reform will be reversed. In the case of policy
reversal, cancellation costs βτF will be incurred.
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3.1.1 Optimal response for the opposition in the presence of IMF con-
ditionality
Similarily, for the opposition the payoff functions will become
pi′O(A; τ1) = 1− |τ0 − τ1| − β(τF − τ1)
= 1− τ1 − β(τF − τ1)
(3.3)
(3.3) shows the payoff for the opposition if he chooses to accept a proposal. If
he rejects, the expected payoff becomes
E(pi′O(R; τ1);λ) = λ(1− |τ0 − τ | − cp − β(τF − τ1))
+ (1− λ)γ(1− |τ0 − τ0| − β(τF − τ0))
= λ(1− τ1 − cp) + (1− λ)γ − β(τF − λτ1)
(3.4)
We see immediately that the presence of the IMF will affect the optimal re-
sponse for the opposition. Now, the opposition will accept any proposal such that
pi′O(A; τ1) ≥ E(pi′O(R; τ1);λ) (3.5)
By inserting for the payoff functions and rearranging the terms like we did
in section 2.3 we get the following expressions for the optimal response of the
opposition: Accept any level of reform such that
τ1 ≤ λ
(1− λ)(1− β)cp −
(γ − 1)
1− β ≡ τ¯
′ =
τ¯
1− β (3.6)
These new compromsing levels of reform, which will be determined by the
investment response, correspond to the dashed expected value of τ1 in figure 3.1.
(3.6) shows that involving the IMF in the reform will strengthen the hand of
the reformer in domestic politics. This result is similar to the assertion of Schelling
(1980, p. 22) that ”the power to bind an adversary may depend on the power to
bind oneself”. This strategy is of course only effective in as much as the opposition
actually care about the costs of noncompliance. However, as the discussion at
the beginning of this chapter revealed, a program interruption can have severe
consequences for the whole economy. Therefore, I argue, the assumption that the
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opposition internalizes these costs is hardly a controversial one.
The cancellation costs will have a dual effect. By strengthening the hand of the
reformer the executive will be able to reach a more favourable compromise with
the opposition. At the same time, by punishing non-compliance it might become
more costly to reach a compromise rather than a more ambitious reform. It is also
worth noticing that the level increase in the reforms that can be reached through
a compromise will be greater for stronger governments as
τ¯ ′0 − τ¯0 =
β
1− β τ¯0(λ) (3.7)
Conditionality can be expected to influence different types of reformers in dif-
ferent ways. Therefore, I will now return to the taxonomy that was presented in
section 2.7 and discuss each type individually. But before I do this, we need to
adress the possibility of new equilibria emerging from IMF conditionality.
3.1.2 Emergence of new equilibria
Taking another look at figure 3.1 we see that adding the Fund to reform might
bring about new equilibria for levels of reform at- and slightly below τ¯ ′(λL). These
equilibria emerge because the cancellation costs improve the bargaining power of
the government vis-a`-vis the opposition. With a level of reform equal to τ¯ ′(λL),
there will be two Nash equilibria in the game between the domestic investors, like
the cases we looked at in section 2.5. Given that the other domestic investors
decides to invest domestically, it will be optimal for an individual investor to
invest as well. However, if the investors anticipates that the aggregate investment
response will be poor, it will be optimal to invest in the foreign asset.
Table 3.1 shows the assurance game between the investors for levels of reform
that may generate investment from the domestic investors and not be rejected by
the opposition. Formally, this requires that:
r∗ + 1
r
≤ τ1 ≤ τ¯ ′L (3.8)
However, looking at figure 3.1, it is clear that the expected return for a lonesome
investor is substantially lower than the risk-free return on the foreign asset, making
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A
αA = 0 αA = 1
B
αB = 0 r
∗
r∗
rτ1λ0 − 1
r∗
αB = 1 r
∗
rτ1λ0 − 1
rτ1 − 1
rτ1 − 1
Table 3.1: Assurance game between domestic investors with new equilibria
it improbable that the investors will be able to coordinate on the (1, 1) equilibrium.
Thus, implementing a level of reform that satisfies (3.8) in the hope of generating
investment in order for the reform to be accepted by the opposition comes at a
high risk for the reformer that is illustrated in figure 3.1.
These new equilibria could be fierce contenders for the subgame perfect equi-
librium level of reform, where it not for the difficulties of getting the investors
to respond positively to these levels of reform. Although the emergence on new
equilibria is a very interesting possibility, in the following, I will therefore neglect
τ¯ ′(λL) in the discussion of optimal levels of reform.
3.1.3 The brave idealist
To see how the cancellation costs can influence the outcomes we can compare the
ranking of alternatives with and without them.
pi′G(τ¯
′
0)− E(pi′G(τ ∗);λ0) > piG(τ¯0)− E(piG(τ ∗);λ0) (3.9)
If (3.9) is satisfied, the presence of the IMF will increase the attractiveness of
reaching a compromise with the opposition relative to implementing τ ∗. Assum-
ing that the level of reform set in the IMF conditionality, τF , is larger than the
unconstrained optimum and inserting for the payoff functions, (3.9) becomes
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µ(1− |τ ∗ − τ¯ ′0|)− β(τF − τ¯ ′0)− λ0(µ− β(τF − τ ∗)− (1− λ0)(1− τ ∗ − β(τF ))
> µ(1− |τ ∗ − τ¯0|)− λ0µ− λ0(1− τ ∗)
(3.10)
which after rearranging the terms and assuming that τ ∗ > τ¯ ′0, can be expressed
as:
µ(τ¯ ′0 − τ¯0) > β(λ0τ ∗ − τ¯ ′0) (3.11)
In order for IMF conditionality to increase the incentives to implement τ ∗, so
that (3.11) is not satisfied, the expected value of this reform must be substantially
larger than the new level of compromising reform. Looking at figure 3.1, we see
that this will only be the case for very high levels of τ ∗. Thus, some of the countries
that would implement their unconstrained optimum in the absence of IMF will now
contemplate reaching a compromise instead.
For the ranking between implementation of τ ∗ and τH , the cancellation costs
will only have an effect through making it more costly to implement the reform
with the lowest expected value. As the high investment level of reform is more
likely to be sustained, the presence of an IMF agreement will increase the in-
centives for the government to go beyond its own unconstrained preferences in
order to generate investment. However, the τ ∗-country is assumed to be unable
to generate investment response with its reforms, and IMF conditionality provides
no mechanism to improve on this failure to convince the investors. This means
that, when considering how costs of noncompliance will affect the incentives for
the brave idealist, (3.11) is really the only relevant condition.
3.1.4 Compromisers and true reformers
We characterized the compromisers as a country with a strong government and
a lower unconstrained optimum level of reform than the brave idealists. These
features will make (3.11) more likely to hold for countries who were compromisers
without the IMF, as they will experience a greater level increase in the compromis-
ing level of reform. Thus, for the compromisers, implementing their unconstrained
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optimum becomes a less viable option then IMF is involved. Unless, of course, the
increased bargaining power from the IMF conditionality enables the government
to reach τ ∗ through a compromise.
Furthermore, for the true reformers, the costs of noncompliance will only make
it more costly to implement their unconstrained optimum relative to the high
investment level of reform. So we cannot expect IMF conditionality to turn neither
a compromiser or a true reformer into a brave idealist.
As before, if τ¯ ′0  τ ∗ and τH  τ ∗, the optimal level of reform will be to
either reach a compromise with the opposition or to implement a reform that is
able to generate a high investment response. The ranking between these alterna-
tives will naturally also be affected by the presence of an IMF agreement. Now,
compromising will be preferable to a reform that will yield high investment if:
pi′G(τ¯
′
0) ≥ E(pi′G(τH);λH) (3.12)
which is the same as
(1− λH)(µ− 1 + τ ∗) ≥ µ(|τ ∗ − τ¯ ′0| − λH |τ ∗ − τH |) + β(λHτH − τ¯ ′0) (3.13)
We can reckognize most of the expressions in (3.13) from the comparison of
τH and the compromising level of reform in the chapter 2. The only difference is
the increased level of reform that can be reached through a compromise, and the
increased cost of doing so rather than implementing a higher level of reform.
If we compare the ranking of reaching a compromise or implementing a reform
that is able to generate a high investment response with and without the IMF,
we see that the costs of noncompliance will necessarily have an ambiguous effect
on the incentives to reform. This is shown in equation (3.15). If τF ≥ τH , the
presence of the IMF will make compromising with the opposition more desirable
relative to implementing a high level of reform if:
pi′G(τ¯
′
0)− E(pi′G(τH);λH) > piG(τ¯0)− E(piG(τH);λH) (3.14)
which by simply inserting for the expressions becomes
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µ(τ¯ ′0 − τ¯0) > β(λHτH − τ¯ ′0) (3.15)
The right hand side of this inequality shows the expected difference in costs of
noncompliance by implementing a level of reform that is able to generate a high
investment and reaching a compromise with the opposition. The left hand side
shows the increased desirability of compromising at a higher level of reform than
in the absence of the IMF. (3.15) shows that the presence of the conditionality can
cause the ranking of these alternatives to change in either direction. However, the
direction of this effect will depend on the strenght of the government. A strong
government will have both a higher level increase in the compromising reform,
making the left hand side bigger. Additionally, a strong government will be able
to convince the investors to coordinate on the cooperative equilibrium with lower
levels of reform, thereby having a lower τH than that of a weaker government.
Thus, the costs of noncompliance with IMF conditionality will have a negative
effect on the incentive to implement a high level of reform in the countries that are
more likely to be able to implement such a reform in the first place. This distortion
of the incentives may lead to some of the ”marginal” true reformers, that is the
true reformers who was on the verge of being a compromiser without the IMF, to
become compromisers.
If we relax the constraint of τF > τH , and only assume that the conditionality
set by the IMF exceeds the level of reform that can be reached through a com-
promisem, and use the general expression for the costs of non-compliance from
equation (3.1), (3.15) becomes:
µ(τ¯ ′0 − τ¯0) > β
(
λHτ
F − λHmax{τF − τH , 0} − τ¯ ′0
)
µ(τ¯ ′0 − τ¯0) > β
(
λHmin{τF , τH} − τ¯ ′0
) (3.16)
Here, we see that less conditionality will increase the incentives for the govern-
ment to reach a compromise rather than implementing an investment generating
reform, by making the former option less costly.
The simple analysis presented in this section reveals that:
• The countries reaching a compromise without the IMF will be likely to reach
a compromise in the presence of an IMF agreement as well. The increased
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leniency of the opposition makes the government able to reach a compro-
mise at a higher level of reform. It may even enable them to reach their
unconstrained optimum. If the government was able to reach the uncon-
strained optimum without the IMF, the presence of conditionality will not
change the outcome. As long as µ > β, the marginal costs of implementing
a higher level of reform will be larger than the marginal reduction in costs
of non-compliance.
• IMF conditionality will reduce the policy gap between the unconstrained
optimum and the compromising level of reform while the gap between τH and
τ ∗ will be unaffected, as conditionality will not alter the sustainability of a
given level of reform beyond its influence on the domestic politics. Therefore,
the true reformers will be more tempted to reach a compromise when the
IMF is involved.
• IMF conditionality will make both the compromising equilibrium and the
high investment equilibrium more desirable relative to the unconstrained
optimum. Thus, the government of a former τ ∗-country could be tempted to
go either way when IMF conditionality is added to the equation. However,
the presence of IMF conditionality will not make the government any more
able to generate investment with the reform. Therefore, an ambitious reform
program will still have a low probability of being sustained and the expected
costs of non-compliance for such a reform will be quite high due to the high
probability of a policy reversal. Thus, a government who selected τ ∗ without
the IMF because there was no alternative yielding a positive investment
response will be more inclined to reach a compromise with the opposition,
implementing a highly diluted reform program when the IMF is involved.
• Lower conditionality in the IMF agreement will distort the incentives for
the government in the direction of implementing a compromise rather than
going for glory and implement a reform that will generate investment. Lower
unit costs of noncompliance, β, will have the same effect for a given level of
compromising reform. However, a lower β will also reduce the highest level
of reform that will be accepted by the opposition.
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The analysis above suggest that the outcomes are a result of calculations by
the government, regarding whether or not implementation of conditions will be in
their best interst. This is in line with the results from Killick (1998). Furthermore,
Killick concludes that: ”. . . in the general case, conditionality is not an effective
means of improving economic policies in recipient countries”. The analysis in this
chapter goes even further and suggests that conditionality may actually be harmful
for the incentives to reform. On the positive side, even though some of the true
reformers might be tempted to become compromisers, the compromisers will be
enabled by conditionality to implement more substantial reform. In this respect,
IMF conditionality can be said to be reform enhancing. This result only holds,
of course, when noncompliance is effectively punished in some way, either by IMF
itself or by other creditors/investors. If not, conditionality will play no role at all.
3.2 Investor confidence
Another way that the IMF can influence the outcomes is through the confidence
of the investors. In section 2.5 we saw that implementing a reform so that the
expected return in the domestic return in the cooperative equilibrium is higher
than the return of the foreign asset was not enough to ensure investment response.
In order to convince the investors, the government would have to go further beyond
its unconstrained optimum. We also learned that when the government is forced
to go too far beyond their unconstrained optimum in order to generate investment,
they will be more likely to go for a compromise with the opposition instead. The
result being a diluted reform package.
IMF agreements have often been assumed to have a ”catalytic” effect on in-
vestment where the ”seal of approval” from the Fund is assumed to increase the
credibility of the policy reform. Bird and Rowlands (2002) presents an empirical
analysis of the catalysis which raises doubts about this assumption. In the model
I have presented in this thesis there is no means by which IMF can be thought to
increase the probability that a reform will be sustained as this is determined by
the domestic politics. However, it could be worthwhile to entertain the idea that
the presence of the IMF increases the condifence of the investors.
Suppose tying the reform program to an IMF agreement increases the confi-
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dence in the aggregate investment response for each individual investor. In the
discussion of multiple equilibria in section 2.4 it became clear that when the in-
vestors anticipate a high investment response it will become optimal for them to
invest as well. Reducing the perceived risk of ending up as a lonesome investors
will increase the probability of the investors coordinating on the Pareto optimal
Nash equilibrium of domestic investment. Provided, of course, that the expected
return on the domestic investment exceeds that of the risk-free foreign asset. In
this way, reducing the risk of vicious circles undermining the sustainability of the
reform, tying the reform to an IMF agreement could enable the countries who
were not able to generate investment on their own to implement an investment
generating reform as well. For the countries who were able to generate investment,
the catalytic effect of an IMF agreement can be able to convince the investors with
less substantial reforms.
If the ”seal of approval” from the IMF makes the investors coordinate on the
cooperative equilibrium for lower levels of reform, this channel of IMF influence
will make a level of reform generating a high investment response a more viable
option. This (hypothetical) channel of IMF influence can compensate for the detri-
mental effect of conditionality on the incentives for some of the true reformers, by
reducing the policy gap between the unconstrained optimum and the investment
generating level of reform. Furthermore, it can enable the brave idealists to gen-
erate investment and thus become a true reformer. It may even make some of the
”marginal compromisers” consider implementing a higher level of reform.
This is not to say that increasing the confidence of the investors necessarily
will be conducive to deeper reform programs. Remember, the governments who
was ready to implement a reform that would yield a high investment response in
the absence of IMF will now prefer to implement a less ambitious reform program
if this is closer to the unconstrained optimum. However, this channel of IMF
influence will increase the incentives to generate a high investment response for
governments who would not do so without IMF assistance.
• For the compromisers, the lower level of reform necessary to induce a high
investment response will make it more tempting to do so, by reducing the
policy gap between the unconstrained optimum and the level of reform nec-
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essary to generate investment. Furthermore, there may be lower expected
costs of non-compliance associated with implementation of the high invest-
ment level of reform. Thus, some of the ”marginal compromisers” may decide
to implement a higher level of reform if the IMF provides a credible guarantee
for the lonesome investors.
• For the brave idealists, tying the reform to an IMF agreement could make
them overcome the reforms susceptibility to vicious circles. Then, it can
become optimal to go beyond the unconstrained optimum and implement an
investment generating reform with a higher chance of being sustained.
• The true reformers, who would implement a reform able to generate a high
investment response without an IMF agreement will be able to implement a
lower level of reform without losing support for its continuance. They will
find it optimal to reduce the level of reform whenever τH > τ ∗.
In this way, an IMF agreement can serve to increase the reform efforts for some
of the compromisers and for the brave idealists. However, the true reformers will
have incentives to dilute their reform program slightly and still be able to generate
investment.
3.3 Which countries turn to the Fund?
Several authors have argued that governments turn to the IMF in order to push
through unpopular reforms that they are not able to implement on their own, im-
plying that conditionality is a motivation to bring in the Fund in itself. Przeworski
and Vreeland (2000) finds evidence that governments turn to the IMF to shield
themselves from the political costs of adjustment policies, and in the words of
Putnam (1988): ”International negotiations sometimes enable government leaders
to do what they privately wish to do, but are powerless to do domestically.”
Assuming that the government has perfect foresight at the time they sign the
IMF agreement we can compare the expected utility with and without the Fund
to see which countries are more likely to turn to the IMF in the first place. To
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make the dicussion as neat as possible I will once again rely on the taxonomy from
section 2.7.
We have already seen how conditionality can influence the incentives of the
reformist government. Now we can use this to investigate how this feature of IMF
assistance can determine whether or not the government will find it optimal to
turn to the IMF in the first place.
3.3.1 The compromisers
For the compromiser, IMF conditionality will allow the government to implement
a higher level of reform without the risk of losing power. In this way we can say
that IMF conditionality is indeed conducive to more substantial reforms.
A compromising government will be better off with an IMF agreement if
pi′G(τ¯
′
0) > piG(τ¯0) (3.17)
By inserting the payoff functions and rearranging the terms, (3.17) can be
expressed as:
µ(|τ ∗ − τ¯0| − |τ ∗ − τ¯ ′0|) > β(τF − τ¯ ′0) (3.18)
We can see that the decision of whether or not to turn to the Fund is a com-
parison of the costs of noncompliance and the ideological benefits from obtaining a
level of reform closer to the unconstrained optimum. Thus, only the governments
who will get a rather large increase in the compromising level of reform will find
it optimal to turn to the Fund in the first place.
3.3.2 The brave idealists
IMF conditionality seems to be less fruitful in cases where the government would
implement either the unconstrained optimum or a reform that is able to gener-
ate investment in the absence of the IMF. As conditionality itself is not able to
influence the investment response it will in most cases make compromising with
the opposition more tempting, possibly creating compromisers out of both true
reformers and brave idealists.
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For a brave idealist who will become a compromiser with the presence of IMF
conditionality it will be optimal to turn to the Fund if:
pi′G(τ¯
′
0) > E(piG(τ
∗);λ0) (3.19)
which becomes
(1− λ0)(µ− 1 + τ ∗) > µ|τ ∗ − τ¯ ′0|+ β(τF − τ¯ ′0) (3.20)
Also in this case, the reduced risk of a policy reversal must be enough to
compensate for the costs of noncompliance and the policy gap between the uncon-
strained optimum and the compromising level of reform.
For the brave idealists who are not tempted to become compromisers the pres-
ence of IMF conditionality will only serve to make it more costly to implement a
reform that may fail. Thus, only the brave idealists who will become compromis-
ers when the reform is tied to an IMF agreement will contemplate turning to the
Fund.
3.3.3 The true reformers
We discussed earlier the possibility of conditionality creating compromisers out
of true reformers. The governments who find it optimal to take advantage of the
improved bargaining position brought about by the presence of an IMF agreement,
will decide to turn to the Fund if
pi′G(τ¯
′
0) > E(piG(τ
H);λH) (3.21)
which by inserting the payoff functions and rearranging the terms can be ex-
pressed as:
(1− λH)(µ− 1 + τ ∗) + µ(λH |τ ∗ − τH | − |τ ∗ − τ¯ ′|) > β(τF − τ¯ ′) (3.22)
The benefits from becoming a compromiser is of course to reduce the risk of
losing the power rent and of ending up with a policy reversal from 1− λH to zero,
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and in some cases to reduce the expected policy gap. 1
For the true reformers who stay true in the presence of an IMF agreement,
there will be no incentive to turn to the Fund as this will only entail costs from
not complying fully with the conditionality. As no true reformer who stays true will
decide to turn to the IMF for assistance, only the true reformers who are willling
to dilute the reform program in order to secure its office will find it optimal to sign
an IMF agreement.
The analysis of this section implies, not surprisingly, that in the absence of
other features of IMF agreements, only the reformers who are planning on taking
advantage of the improved bargaining power caused by conditionality will turn
to the Fund. Furthermore, less conditionality imposed by the IMF will make
the governments more likely to turn to the Fund, as long as the conditionality is
sufficient to increase the bargaining power vis-a`-vis the opposition.
1The second term in the left hand side of (3.22) can be either positive or negative.
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4 Concluding remarks
The model presented in this thesis illustrates the link between the economic re-
sponses to a reform and the domestic politics. A key feature is that the same
policies can have very different outcomes under different political circumstances,
in regard to the ability of the reform to generate investment and the probability
that the reform will be sustained. An important result is that the sustainability
of a reform can be susceptible to virtuous and vicious circles depending on the
expectations of the investors. Depending on the strength of the government, it
may be possible to implement a reform that is immune to these circles by making
domestic investment the dominant strategy for the investors.
In the decision on which level of reform to implement, the government takes
account of the political feasibility of the reform and its ability to generate economic
responses that will build a constituency in favour of the continuation of the reform.
Using the logic of backward induction in sequential games, I have shown how the
anticipation of the investors’ and the political oppositions response to the reform
determines the optimal level of reform for the government.
According to the level of reform that is implemented, I have identified three
types of reformers. The compromisers, the true reformers and the brave idealists.
By introducing IMF to the model we have seen how conditionality can influence
the outcome of the reform process for these reformers. IMF conditionality is shown
to play a dual role. By making it more costly to implement low levels of reform
it also becomes more costly for the political opposition to reject a reform, thus
strengthening the hand of the reformer in domestic politics.
The model implies that the influence of IMF conditionality on the outcome
of the reform effort is highly dependent on the domestic political scene and the
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preferences of the political leadership. When the government is strong and able to
reach a satisfactory compromise with the opposition in the absence of international
assistance, IMF conditionality will serve to strengthen the hand of the reformer
and allow the government to pursue more substantial reforms without the risk of
policy reversal. If the government is strong and willing to implement a reform
that is sufficient to secure a high investment response, conditionality will reduce
the incentives for the government to pursue an ambitious reform program as the
compromising equilibrium becomes more attractive and turn the occasional true
reformer into a compromiser. However, IMF conditionality will only influence the
outcome if the government is more or less indifferent between the high reform and
a compromise in the first place. For a weak government not able to implement
a reform that is sufficiently credible to generate any investment response, IMF
conditionality will not have much impact on the outcome. Conditionality in itself
will not alter the investors assessment of the sustainability of reform beyond its
infleunce on domestic politics, and will thus not enable the reform to generate in-
vestment. Also, the effect of conditionality on the domestic politics is proportional
to the strength of the government. Hence, a weaker government will not get as
large an increase in the level of reform that can be reached through a compromise
as a stronger government.
I have also provided a brief treatment of how the possible ”catalytic” effect of
an IMF agreement can be thought to influence the outcomes within this model
framework. It was shown that if tying the reform program to an IMF agreement
would increase the confidence in the aggregate investment response, governments
who were not able to generate investment with their reforms on their own might
become enabled to do so.
Furthermore, the model implies that conditionality in itself can be sufficient
motivation for turning to the Fund for assistance. By binding itself, although
rather loosely as the analysis suggests, the government is able to bind the opposi-
tion as well and is enabled to push through unpopular reforms without the risking
its office. The flipside of this coin is that this feature of IMF conditionality seems
most appealing to the governments who are not particalurly interested in very
deep reforms.
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4.1 Possible extensions
The scope of this thesis is limited, and in some senses realism has had to be
sacrificed on the altar of analytical clarity. The upside of this is of course that there
are several areas in which the model can be extended and improved upon, the most
promising one being, in my opinion, to relax the assumption of a one-dimensional
reform package. Structural reform programs usually consists of many qualitively
different measures that will be likely to meet varying degrees of opposition. By
allowing for the reform package to include qualitively different policies, the political
game between the government and the opposition would become more exciting and
perhaps illuminate another role for IMF conditionality. This is done in Drazen
(2002), which provides a highly enjoyable read.
Furthermore, the modeling of the IMF could be improved upon. In this thesis
the Fund is only a part of the model through the conditionality it imposes. Rather
than just having IMF lurking in the shadows of the model framework, including
it as a proper agent in the model could provide us with some useful additional
insights into the role of the Fund as a structural adjustment lender.
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